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DESIGN PATENTS: AN ALTERNATIVE WHEN THE
LOW STANDARDS OF COPYRIGHT ARE TOO
HIGH?
 
Ryan Vacca*
I.  INTRODUCTION
The standard for copyright protection is notoriously low)the work must
be independently created by the author and possess a minimal degree of
creativity.1  Nonetheless, even with that generous standard, the courts and the
Copyright Office recognize that certain works do not contain even that
minimum level of creativity such that they are categorically refused copyright
protection.  Blank forms, and other forms that do not convey information, fall
within this category.2
In contrast, and for good reason, the standard for design patent protection
is much more burdensome.  Design patents protect new, original, ornamental,
and non-obvious designs.3  This more difficult standard, which generally
subsumes the copyright standard, would lead one to assume that anything
failing the low copyright standard would not be eligible for design patent
protection.  Then again, one might be wrong.  The Patent and Trademark
Office has issued design patents for blank forms and recent case law has either
upheld design patent protection for blank forms or declined to categorically
refuse such protection.4
This article explores the blank forms doctrine in copyright law, the
overlap between copyright and design patent protection, why the law’s refusal
to protect blank forms under copyright law is necessarily inconsistent with the
law's protection of blank forms via design patents, and possible judicial,
Congressional, or administrative solutions to resolve this inconsistency.
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5. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
6. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (emphasis in original).
7. Id. (emphasis added).
8. Id. (quoting 1 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Copyright § 1.08[C][1](1990); or as metaphorically stated
?The creative spark need not create a shock, but it must at least be perceptible to the touch.”  William
Patry, Can Our Current Conception of Copyright Law Survive the Internet Age?, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 201, 208 (2002–2003).
9. Feist, 499 U.S. at 359.
10. Id. at 364.
11. Id. at 362.
II.  COPYRIGHT PROTECTION (OR LACK THEREOF) FOR BLANK
FORMS
A.  General Requirements for Copyright Protection
The Copyright Act of 1976 provides that ?[c]opyright protection subsists
. . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device.”5  In 1991, the Supreme Court noted that ?[t]he sine qua
non of copyright is originality” and ?[t]o qualify for copyright protection, a
work must be original to the author.”6  Original, in the context of copyright,
means only that the work was independently created and “that it possesses at
least some minimal degree of creativity.”7  To reemphasize this point, the
Court reminded us that ?[t]o be sure, the requisite level of creativity is
extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice” and that ?[t]he vast majority
of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, 'no
matter how crude, humble or obvious' it might be.”8  But even this generous
standard does not permit all works to enjoy copyright protection.  There still
exists a “narrow category of works in which the creative spark is utterly
lacking or so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent.”9  One such category is the
white pages telephone directory.10  The Supreme Court found that the white
pages publisher did not satisfy the minimum level of creativity because it was
“devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity.”11  Another category of works
that fail to meet this modicum of creativity is blank forms.
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12. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
13. Id. at 99–100.
14. Id. at 100.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 101.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 102.
B.  The Blank Forms Doctrine
The denial of copyright protection to blank forms has had and currently
has more than its fair share of problems.  What started off as a simple
conclusory statement by the Supreme Court in 1879 has spawned well over
one hundred years of debate on the ability to copyright blank forms.  As the
courts have been unable to agree on exactly what the blank form doctrine is,
it is difficult to clearly state the rule without exploring its origins, the
Copyright Office's regulation based upon the doctrine, and the courts'
subsequent interpretations thereof.
1.  The History of the Blank Forms Doctrine
In 1879, the Supreme Court decided Baker v. Selden,12 which is
understood, and arguably misunderstood, as the origin of the blank forms
doctrine.  In Baker, Charles Selden had prepared a book entitled Selden's
Condensed Ledger, or Book-keeping Simplified.13  This book exhibited and
explained a system of bookkeeping by means of an introductory essay and
attached forms consisting of ruled lines and headings illustrating the system
and showing how to use and carry out the bookkeeping method.14  The
defendant, Baker, was accused of using a similar bookkeeping system, but
with a different arrangement of the columns and headings.15  Selden contended
that “the ruled lines and headings, given to illustrate the system, [were] a part
of the book, and, as such, [were] secured by the copyright; and that no one
[could] make or use similar ruled lines and headings, or ruled lines and
headings made and arranged on substantially the same system, without
violating the copyright.”16  Importantly, the Court found that the validity of
this contention was “really the question to be decided in this case.”17  
To answer this question, the Court drew “a clear distinction between the
book, as such, and the art which it is intended to illustrate” and noted that this
“proposition is so evident, that it requires hardly any argument to support it.”18
Despite the clarity of this proposition, the Court spent a large portion of its
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19. Id. at 102–04.
20. Id. at 103–05 (“The copyright of a book on perspective, no matter how many drawings and
illustrations it may contain, gives no exclusive right to the modes of drawing described, thought they
may never have been known or used before . . . .  But as embodied and taught in a literary
composition or book, their essence consists only in their statement.  This alone is what is secured by
copyright.”).
21. Id. at 107.
22. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
opinion explaining the difference between obtaining a patent for a system and
securing copyright protection for the explanation of the system.19  The Court
also repeatedly noted that the description of a system in a book is entitled to
copyright, but this does not lay the foundation for an exclusive right to the
system itself.20
Despite the Court's tremendous focus on the copyright law not protecting
the underlying system, the Court's holding was peculiar:
The conclusion to which we have come is, that blank account-books are not
the subject of copyright; and that the mere copyright of Selden's book did not
confer upon him the exclusive right to make and use account-books, ruled
and arranged as designated by him and described and illustrated in said
book.21
The peculiarity of the Court's holding is that it finds the accounting forms,
rather than the bookkeeping system, were not the subject of copyright.  This
holding is consistent with the Court's framing of the issue as whether the ruled
lines and headings (i.e. the blank forms) were entitled to copyright
protection.22  Therefore, the idea/expression dichotomy it spent so much time
explaining could not be the basis for the Court's holding.  However, the Court
did not provide any additional reasoning supporting its holding.
Two rationales are suspected.  One is that the blank forms were not
sufficiently creative to be original and deserving of copyright protection.  The
other is that the blank forms are so closely related to the system, that the
system is incapable of being expressed in any way other than the blank forms.
When this occurs, the system and expression merge into one and neither is
capable of copyright protection.  The merger doctrine provides that when there
is “only one or so few ways of expressing an idea that protection of the
expression would effectively accord protection to the idea itself,” then even the
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23. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2nd Cir. 1991); see also Morrissey v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678–79 (1st Cir. 1967) (finding that permitting copyright protection to
such expressions would be to “recognize copyright as a game of chess in which the public can be
checkmated.”).
24. Kregos, 937 F.2d at 705.
25. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(c) (2006).
26. Advanz Behavioral Mgmt. Resources, Inc. v. Miraflor, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1186, n.8 (C.D. Cal.
1998) (citing Directions for Securing Copyrights 16–17 (1899), reproduced in Compilation of
Regulations Concerning Copyright 1874–1956 (U.S. Copyright Office)).
27. Id.
expression is not protected by copyright law.23  The merger doctrine was
produced as a corollary maxim based on the idea/expression dichotomy.24
The merger rationale is unlikely.  Because the Court initially found that
Baker used a different arrangement of the columns and headings, it suggests
that the basis of the Court's holding was not a merger between the idea and the
expression, but something else.  This leaves the lack of creativity rationale.
But the Court never cites any authority or even sets forth a rule of law
supporting this conclusion.  It is from this uncertain holding that the blank
forms doctrine and its accompanying chaos were born.
2.  Subsequent Interpretations of the Blank Forms Doctrine
a.  Copyright Office Regulations
The Copyright Office, which registers copyrightable works, has, since
1899, had regulations regarding material not subject to copyright.  The current
regulation, promulgated in 1956, provides:
The following are examples of works not subject to copyright and
applications for registration of such works cannot be entertained:
(c) Blank forms, such as time cards, graph paper, account books, diaries,
bank checks, scorecards, address books, report forms, order forms and the
like, which are designed for recording information and do not in themselves
convey information.25
As noted, this is not a new regulation.  In 1899, the Register of Copyrights'
guidelines for obtaining copyright registration simply stated that blank forms
were not copyrightable.26  A few years later, new guidelines were promulgated
elaborating on the denial of copyright protection to blank forms.27  This
guideline provided:
A single sheet, if a literary composition, may be termed a book in applying
for copyright registration, but printed productions which are partly
330 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 31
28. Id. (citing Directions for Securing Copyrights 24 (1901), reproduced in Compilation of Regulations
Concerning Copyright 1874–1956 (U.S. Copyright Office)).
29. Id. (citing Rules and Regulations for the Registration of Claims to Copyright § 5 (1910)).
30. Id. at 1186.
31. 45 Fed. Reg. 63297, 63297–300 (Sept. 24, 1980).
32. See generally id.
33. Id. at 63298 (emphasis added).
34. Id. (emphasis added).
unfinished, or with arranged spaces to be filled in, such as blank forms,
account books, ledgers, memorandum books, diaries, time and score books,
etc., are not productions which can be designated “books” and registered as
such for copyright protection.28
Lastly, after the 1909 Copyright Act was passed, the Copyright Office was
granted authority to issue regulations implementing the Copyright Act and it
promulgated the following:
The term “book” cannot be applied to blank books for use in business or
carrying out any system of transacting affairs such as record books, account
books, memorandum books, diaries or journals, bank deposit and check
books; forms of contracts or leases which do not contain original
copyrightable matter; coupons; forms for use in commercial, legal, or
financial transactions, which are wholly or partly blank and its value lies in
their usefulness and not in their merit as literary compositions.29
After the 1976 Copyright Act was enacted, the Copyright Office revisited
its regulation on blank forms.30  The re-examination was terminated in 1980
without amending the existing regulation.31  However, the explanation for
maintaining the regulation did not shed much light on the basis for denying
copyright protection to blank forms.  The inquiry suggested that the problem
may lie in originality or the idea/expression dichotomy, although most of the
focus was on originality.32  For example, the inquiry termination found that
“[a] work which lacks even a minimal amount of original, creative expression
should be denied registration regardless of whether it embodied a new or
original idea.”33  Further, the Copyright Office stated: 
The Baker case and its progeny are embodied in the longstanding practice of
the Copyright Office to deny registration of a claim in a form designed
merely to record information if that form contains no original literary or
artistic expression (i.e., it is “blank”).  If a work does evidence at least an
appreciable amount of such original, creative expression, the Copyright
Office will register a claim, regardless of whether or not the work also
contains uncopyrightable elements designed for the simple recordation of
information.34
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35. Id. (“[C]opyright may be claimed only in the 'expression' embodied in a work of authorship, and not
in its 'idea,'” “[T]he basic dichotomy between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable idea(s)
remains unchanged.”).
36. Aldrich v. Remington Rand, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Tex. 1942).
37. Id. at 733.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 734.
41. Id.
42. Id.
On the other hand, the inquiry also lends support to the idea/expression
dichotomy as a basis for denying copyright protection to blank forms.  Citing
the House Report accompanying the 1976 Copyright Act, the Copyright Office
determined that the 1976 Act maintained the idea/expression dichotomy.35
Because of the Copyright Office's failure to enlighten the public or the
judiciary and clarify the reasoning behind the denial of copyright protection
to blank forms, we were left in no better position than where Baker v. Selden
left us.  The problem was further complicated by reintroducing the
idea/expression rationale, rather than the merger doctrine.
b.  The Blank Forms Doctrine Primarily Concerns Originality or Merger?
The cases interpreting Baker v. Selden and the Copyright Office's
regulation denying copyright protection to blank forms do little to clarify
whether the rule is about originality or merger.  
In Aldrich v. Remington Rand, Inc.,36 the plaintiff devised a bookkeeping
system and expressed this system in a book.37  The back of the plaintiff's book
contained many forms illustrating his system.38  The court determined that the
principal question to be decided was whether the forms were copyrightable.39
After quoting substantially from Baker v. Selden, the court held that
“[p]laintiff's forms of themselves imparted no more information than the words
‘credit’ or ‘debit’ at the head of such columns as we ordinarily see in any
system of simple bookkeeping.”40  The focus on the ordinary suggests that the
problem was with originality.  
But the court was not finished.  It found the forms embodied in practice
what the plaintiff taught and the plaintiff's forms could be used, modified,
changed, improved, or made worse by the public without infringing.41  The
court then asked, “How could the public appropriate the system identically, if
it could not use the forms?”42  This language suggests that the problem was
that the forms had merged with the underlying system.
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43. Id. at 735–36.
44. Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
45. Id. at 518.
46. Id. at 523 (noting that the limitations on the answer sheets concerned the shape and maximum number
of response positions, whether they shall be set horizontally or vertically, the weight of the paper, the
size of the sheet, and the number of lines per inch).
47. Id.
48. Id.
Lastly, the court in Aldrich focused on the Copyright Office's regulation
providing that books entitled to copyright protection could not be applied to:
Blank books for use in business or in carrying out any system of transacting
affairs, such as record books, account books, memorandum books, blank
diaries or journals, bank deposit and check books; forms of contracts or
leases which do not contain original copyrightable matter; coupons; forms for
use in commercial, legal, or financial transactions, which are wholly or partly
blank and whose value lies in their usefulness.43
This regulation compounds the confusion of Baker v. Selden; it describes the
reasoning for denying copyright protection as not containing original
copyrightable matter, but also because the “value lies in their usefulness.”
Again, one must wonder whether the reasoning behind denying blank forms
copyright protection was because they did not possess the requisite amount of
creativity or because the idea and expression had merged.  In the end, Aldrich
did not help clarify the problem.
Almost thirty years later, the court in Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., v.
Graphic Controls Corporation,44 was confronted with the following question:
“Are printed answer sheets, created for use in conjunction with student
achievement and intelligence tests and designed to be corrected by optical
scanning machines, the proper subject of copyright?”45  At issue were
standardized test answer sheets.  The court ultimately found that the answer
sheets were entitled to copyright protection.  
The court held that although the physical area for originality was limited
by the requirements of the optical scanning machine, the answer sheets did
meet the minimal degree of creativity required to be original.46  The minimum
level of creativity was apparently expressed by the division of the response
positions across the page, the information asked for (e.g. name, age, date), a
determination of whether the student should record on the face of the answer
sheet, the symbolic code indicating what question is being asked and what
possible alternative answer slots may be selected, the instruction explaining
how to use the answer sheet in conjunction with an examination, and examples
illustrating such use.47  From these “expressions,” the court found originality.48
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49. Time-Saver Check, Inc. v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 178 U.S.P.Q. 510 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
50. Id. at 510.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 511 (emphasis added).
54. Id.
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. Edwin K. Williams & Co., Inc. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co., East, 542 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1976).
57. Id. at 1061.
Although granting copyright protection to arguably blank forms, the court in
Harcourt, Brace & World seized upon the originality issue of the blank forms
doctrine and helped clarify the underlying problem.
Two years later in 1973, the court in Time-Saver Check, Inc. v. Deluxe
Check Printers, Inc.49 also strengthened the argument that the blank forms
doctrine was about originality.  In Time-Saver Check, the plaintiff designed
and produced a book “related to printed commercial bank checks and attached
separate duplicates used with carbon paper that [were] meant to be retained as
accurate records of the checks that [were] written.”50  The books contained
“several diagrams and illustrations of checks and various duplicate forms to
be attached thereto and used with carbon paper.”51  The book also contained
“written descriptions and characterizations of the checks, the duplications, the
method of binding and producing the marketable product, and the manner in
which the check and the duplicate copy [were] to be used.”52
The court in Time-Saver Check cited the Copyright Office's Circular 32
entitled “Blank Forms and Other Uncopyrightable Works” which stated:
Blank forms and similar works, designed to record rather than to convey
information, cannot be copyrighted.  In order to be copyrightable, a work
must contain at least a certain minimum amount of original literary,
pictorial, or musical material.53
Based upon this rule, the court found that the plaintiff's checks were “not of
such a nature that they [were] entitled to protection under the Copyright
Statute” because there was “nothing about them which [was] creative, original,
or artistic.”54  Later, the court reiterated its holding when it stated that “[t]he
checks and the forms for duplicate copies upon which plaintiff relies embody
no original creative artistic characteristics, and are therefore not protected
under copyright law.”55  The Time-Saver Check decision was another step
forward in finding that a lack of originality is the problem with blank forms.
Adding a semantic twist to the blank forms doctrine, the court in Edwin K.
Williams & Co., Inc. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co. East56 held that gasoline
station record-keeping books were entitled to copyright protection.57  The court
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58. Id. at 1060.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1060–61.
62. Id. at 1061.
63. Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
64. Id. at 911.
65. Id.  Of course, this is not necessarily the case because if one independently created the forms, then
there would be no copyright infringement because no actual copying would have taken place.
found the books contained several pages of instructions followed by thirty-one
pages of blank forms, one page for each day of the month.58  The user was to
fill in the day's transactions in the various boxes on the blank forms.59  Some
of the instructions showed the user how to fill in the forms and others showed
the user how to operate his business.60  The court recognized Baker v. Selden
and noted that the Copyright Office's regulation prohibited copyright
protection for blank forms that do not in themselves convey information.61
The court affirmed the district court's finding that the books at issue conveyed
information.62
The intriguing aspect of the Copyright Office's regulation and the Edwin
K. Williams court's adherence to its language is that the issue was framed in
terms of the conveyance of information rather than a lack of originality or the
application of the merger doctrine.  The failure to convey information adds
another dimension to the quagmire of the blank forms doctrine.  Are works
failing to convey information merely a subset of those works lacking
originality?  Are these works a subset of those merging with their underlying
idea because they can only be used for recording information?  
The genesis of this part of the Copyright Office's regulation appears to be
Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner,63 where the court found that charts used to
record temperature and pressure were incapable of copyright protection
because the forms did not intend to communicate facts or ideas, but were
intended solely for use in making records of facts.64  The Brown Instrument
court explained that because the forms were necessarily used with the
associated machines, granting copyright protection to the forms would “in
effect continue [plaintiff's] monopoly of its machines beyond the time
authorized by the patent law.”65  Thus, the Copyright Office's regulation
requiring blank forms to convey information appears to suggest that merger
plays a part in the blank forms doctrine.  Given its reliance on the Copyright
Office's regulation and the historical context for it, Edwin K. Williams supports
the notion that the blank forms doctrine is based on merger rather than
originality.
2007] Design Patents 335
66. John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 207 U.S.P.Q. 664 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
67. Id. at 667.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 971 (11th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 972 (emphasis added).
72. Januz Mktg. Communications, Inc. v. Doubleday & Co., 569 F. Supp. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
73. Id. at 81.
In John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc.,66 the district court held the
plaintiff's blank checks were not entitled to copyright protection.67  However,
its reasoning was far from clear.  The court noted that Baker v. Selden was
controlling and found that the plaintiff's checks actually represented a new
system for recording checkbook entries and as such, was not subject to
copyright protection.68  This reasoning reintroduces and suggests that the
problem lies in the idea/expression dichotomy.  But later in its opinion, the
district court found the plaintiff's checks did “not convey any additional
information other than that which is contained in an ordinary bank check,
which neither party contends is copyrightable.  It contains no instructions other
than specifying ‘Pay To’ and ‘For’ lines, as well as indicating spaces for the
date and dollar amount.”69  This statement muddied the waters by suggesting
that the reasoning for denying the blank checks copyright protection was that
they lacked originality.
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion, but
did not clarify this issue.  The Eleventh Circuit first noted that “[i]t is well
established that blank forms which do not convey information or contain
original pictorial expression are not copyrightable.”70  After citing to the
Copyright Office's regulation, the court held that the plaintiff's blank checks
were “merely designed for recording information and [did] not convey
information or contain original pictorial expression.”71  Because the court
separated conveying information from originality, it supported the notion that
both merger and originality were the underlying problems with blank forms.
The Eleventh Circuit's opinion did not contain a discussion of the
idea/expression dichotomy, which helped refocus the rationale for the blank
forms doctrine back to originality and merger rather than expanding the
analysis as the district court had done.  However, the court's failure to separate
the analysis lends little support to the reasoning behind its decision.
In 1982, the court in Januz Marketing Communications, Inc. v. Doubleday
& Company, Inc.72 found that charts used to record daily activities were not
entitled to copyright protection.73  The two charts at issue are pictured below
as Figures 1 and 2.
336 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 31
Figure 1
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74. Id. at 78.
75. Id. at 79.
76. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
77. Januz, 569 F. Supp. at 81.
78. Bibbero Sys., Inc. v. Colwell Sys., Inc., 893 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1990).
Figure 2
Rejecting copyright protection for these forms, the court noted that the
Copyright Office's regulation “embodies the well established rule of Baker v.
Selden, 'that forms usable only for the recording of information are not
copyrightable.'”74  However, like the court in Edwin K. Williams, the court also
noted that “[a]lthough blank forms or charts are, generally, not copyrightable
under Baker v. Selden, there is an exception to this rule.  If the blank forms or
charts contain 'language explanatory of' and 'inseparably included' in the
copyrighted textual material, then the forms or charts are protected because
they convey information.”75  Again, this rule in and of itself does not clearly
denote whether the problem with blank forms exists as a result of originality
or merger, but as already explained, the regulation's origin suggests a problem
of merger.76  The court ultimately held that the forms in question “did not
convey any information, either by adding to or clarifying the system,” and thus
did not fall within the exception to Baker v. Selden.77
In 1990, the Ninth Circuit decided Bibbero Systems, Inc. v. Colwell
Systems, Inc.78 and held the plaintiff's blank forms used in medical billing,
338 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 31
79. Id. at 1105.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1106–07.
82. Id. at 1107 (citing Edwin K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co.-East, 542 F.2d 1053, 1061
(9th Cir. 976)).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1107–08.
86. Id. at 1108.
87. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2nd Cir. 1991).
known as “superbills,” were not entitled to copyright protection.79  Each
superbill contained simple instructions to the patient for filing insurance
claims, boxes for patient information, simple clauses assigning insurance
benefits to the doctor and authorizing release of patient information, and two
lengthy checklists for the doctor to indicate the diagnosis and any services
performed, as well as the applicable fee.80
The court in Bibbero cited Baker v. Selden and the Copyright Office's
regulation on blank forms and stated that blank forms are generally not
copyrightable unless text is integrated with them.81  The court explained that
when “a work consists of text integrated with blank forms, the forms have
explanatory force because of the accompanying copyrightable textual
material.”82  The plaintiff argued that its superbills did convey information, but
the court rejected this argument finding that “[a]ll forms seek only certain
information, and, by their selection, convey that the information sought is
important [and that t]his cannot be what the Copyright Office intended by the
statement 'convey information.'”83  The court described the superbill's purpose
(before it is filled out) as recording information, rather than conveying
information about the patient.84  The court further found that although there
was a great deal of printing on the face of the form)because there were many
possible diagnoses and treatments)this did “not make the form any less
blank.”85  
The court found that the “text with forms” exception to the blank forms
rule was inapplicable, because the instructions to the patient on how to file an
insurance claim were “far too simple to be copyrightable as text in and of
themselves.”86  In essence, the instructions were not original.  And strictly
speaking, although the instructions were not sufficiently original, this
statement does not shed any light on whether the forms themselves lacked
originality or whether the idea and expression had merged.  Reading between
the lines, however, suggests a problem with originality rather than merger.
In 1991, the Second Circuit, in Kregos v. Associated Press,87 threw yet
another twist into the blank forms labyrinth.  The court was confronted with
whether a blank form used to record statistics about baseball pitchers was
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88. Id. at 708 (contrasting, inter alia, Bibbero with Harcourt, Brace & World).
89. Id.
90. Id. (“When the Copyright Office denies a copyright to scorecards or diaries that 'do not in themselves
convey information,' it must be contemplating works with headings so obvious that their selection
cannot be said satisfy even minimal creativity.”).
91. Id. at 710.
92. Id. at 705.
entitled to copyright protection.  The court paid its due deference to Baker v.
Selden and noted that courts have split over the issue of whether “forms that
include considerable blank space” are capable of copyright protection.88  It
acknowledged that “a form that conveys no information and serves only to
provide blank space for recording information contains no expression or
selection of information that could possibly warrant copyright protection.”89
But then the court made an interesting comment; it stated that copyright
protection is denied from the failure to convey information because if
information is not conveyed, then the form fails to “satisfy even minimal
creativity.”90
In the end, the court found that summary judgment in favor of the
defendants was improper because it could not be determined, as a matter of
law, that the plaintiff did not display sufficient creativity in selecting the
columns and headings used on the pitching form.91
Kregos is important for two reasons.  First, it found that the failure of
blank forms to convey information was fatal because of originality, rather than
merger.  This stands opposite the origin of the Copyright Office's regulation
concerning the conveyance of information)Brown Instrument, discussed
supra)and completes the transformation from the merger argument in Brown
Instrument through the murky period of the decisions in John H. Harland and
Januz to the originality argument in Kregos.
The second reason Kregos is important is that it drew a distinction
between the concept of merger and the blank forms doctrine.  Earlier in its
opinion, and in a different section with its own analysis, the Kregos court
recognized that
The fundamental copyright principle that only the expression of an idea and
not the idea itself is protectable has produced a corollary maxim that even
expression is not protected in those instances where there is only one or so
few ways of expressing an idea that protection of the expression would
effectively accord protection to the idea itself.92
The fact that the Kregos court distinguished this section from its blank forms
discussion, coupled with the focus on originality in the blank forms section,
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93. See also ABR Benefits Services, Inc. v. NCO Group, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1119, 1999 WL 695596 at 32
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 1999) (“The restrained interpretation of the Blank Form Rule followed by the Third
Circuit mandates that the relevant inquiry is whether [the forms] are sufficiently innovative and
informative such that the Blank Form Rule does not apply.”).
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95. Id. at 1183 (citations omitted).
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strongly suggests that the blank forms doctrine is not about merger at all, but
rather is purely about originality.93
Having now explored the corridors of the historical maze constituting the
blank forms doctrine, it is fitting that the most telling words come from a
relatively modern case.  As the court in Advanz Behavioral Management
Resources, Inc. v. Miraflor94 stated:
The blank forms rule is problematic.  [It] has been criticized on a variety of
grounds.  It has been argued that the rule is an unwarranted extension of dicta
contained in Baker v. Selden, that it lacks a consistent rationale, that it is
inconsistent with the purposes of the Copyright Act, and that in light of
interpretative guidelines issued by the Copyright Office after the 1976
revision of the Copyright Act there is no such rule.  These criticisms are
justified.95
The court also appropriately concluded that “[a]lthough its origin is clear, the
theoretical basis of the blank forms rule is murky.”96
In Advanz, the plaintiff had developed blank medical forms, which are
reproduced below as Figures 3 through 7.
2007] Design Patents 341
Figure 3
342 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 31
Figure 4
Figure 5
2007] Design Patents 343
Figure 6
344 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 31
97. Id. at 1190.
Figure 7
The plaintiff argued these forms were entitled to copyright protection, but the
court rejected this argument and found that there was “nothing about the
appearance, structure, or layout of the forms, that [was] artistic, creative,
innovative or distinctive.  They simply consist of labeled blanks in which
check marks may be made or information may be recorded.”97  Moreover, the
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98. Id.  Of course, the court also strongly criticized Bibbero and the blank forms doctrine in general, but
acknowledged that it was limited by the Ninth Circuit's prior rulings.
court found that the forms contained no instructions and did not accompany
a pamphlet explaining how they should be used.98  Like many of its
predecessors, the court in Advanz continued to blur the already fuzzy line
between the originality and merger rationales for the blank forms doctrine.
c.  The Common Ground
Despite the confusion and various interpretations about the blank forms
doctrine and its underlying rationale, there exists some common ground upon
which all can agree.  This common ground is for truly blank forms (i.e. those
forms containing nothing more than blank spaces and are without any
accompanying text or instructions).  An example of such is shown below as
Figure 8.
Figure 8
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102. Thomas B. Lindgren, The Sanctity of the Design Patent: Illusion or Reality?  Twenty Years of Design
Patent Litigation Since Compco v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,
10 OKLA. CITY U.  L. REV. 195, 202–03 (Summer 1985).  This is the same Constitutional clause
granting Congress the power to grant copyright protection.
103. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2000).
For those cases following the originality basis for the blank forms
doctrine, truly blank forms fail to establish the minimum amount of creativity
required to be original.  For example, in Kregos, the court found that sufficient
originality could exist in the blank pitching forms by means of the selection of
the statistics to emphasize.  Yet the Kregos court noted that “[o]f course, a
form that conveys no information and serves only to provide blank space for
recording information contains no expression or selection of information that
could possibly warrant copyright protection.”99  Even a court that had found
minimal creativity in a blank form would fail to grant copyright protection to
truly blank forms.  In fact, the Advanz court, which was highly critical of the
blank forms doctrine, acknowledged that truly blank forms would not be
deserving of copyright protection.  The Advanz court stated “[p]erhaps Baker
is best interpreted as authority for the proposition that neither a system nor an
entirely blank form (such as ruled paper) is copyrightable in and of itself.”100
On the other hand, for those cases following the merger basis for the blank
forms doctrine, truly blank forms fail thereunder too.  Truly blank forms are
designed for no other basis than to record information and implement an
underlying system.  Also, because they are truly blank, they convey no
information and fail under the Copyright Office's regulation, regardless of the
underlying rationale.  With these thoughts in mind, we now turn to the equally
intriguing world of design patents.
III.  DESIGN PATENT PROTECTION FOR BLANK FORMS
A.  General Requirements for Design Patent Protection
Since 1842, and under the authority of the “Intellectual Property Clause”
of the U.S. Constitution,101 Congress has afforded patent protection for
designs.102  The current Patent Act provides protection to those who invent
“any new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture.”103  In
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addition to these requirements, the design must also be non-obvious.104  Each
of these elements is explored in detail below.
1.  Originality
Though rarely discussed by the courts, the concept of originality refers
to only granting a patent to the inventor who actually invented the design.  The
originality requirement protects the true inventor and the public by preventing
“one to harvest what another has sown.”105  One purpose of the originality
requirement is to limit patent monopolies to those who have undertaken the
efforts to produce the design and who wish to have the patent rights conferred
upon them.106 
Similar to the originality requirement of copyright law, but less
discussed, is an associated creative spark necessary for design patent
protection. As stated by the Ninth Circuit, “[although] it is difficult to
characterize the inventive features necessary to a valid design patent, it is clear
that there must be originality which is born of inventive genius.  In other
words, there must be more than mere mechanical skill and the completed
article must rise above the ordinary.”107  The court then held that the design in
question, a metal drawer handle, was not new and that “the small differences
between the design in question and prior designs are well within the creative
ability of the ordinary designer.”108  This was echoed years later when a district
court noted that originality connotes something that has been created and it
signifies something which is the converse of commonplace.109  Or as
characterized by one commentator, “[d]esign patents are supposed to reward
a significant level of creativity.”110
Although not discussed in the cases nearly as much as the originality
requirement for copyright, the concept of design patent originality shares this
common thread of creativity with the originality requirement for copyright.111
348 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 31
112. Clark Equip. Co. v. Keller, 570 F.2d 778, 799 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978).
113. Horwitt, 388 F. Supp. at 1260 (quoting Deller’s Walker on Patents, Vol. 2, pg. 748).
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116. Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear California, Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
117. Id.
118. Best Lock, 94 F.3d at 1566.
119. Id.; see also L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“When
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designs are relevant, an inquiry should also be made as to whether the alternative designs could
adversely affect the utility of the specified article).
120. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
2.  New (or Novelty)
Just as with originality, courts rarely give more than a fleeting nod of
acknowledgement to the novelty requirement of design patents instead diving
headfirst into the non-functional and non-obvious requirements.  The
requirement that a design be new or novel “is tested by determining the impact
of the design upon an ordinary observer.  A design patent is novel when the
‘average observer takes the new design for a different, and not a modified
already existing design.’”112  Stated another way, “the design viewed as a
whole ’must produce a new impression upon the eye.’”113
3.  Ornamental (or Non-Functional)
One of the main issues, if not the main issue, concerning design patent
invalidity is that of the ornamental and non-functional requirement.  The
ornamental requirement means that the design must not be governed solely by
function.114  Thus, if the design claimed is dictated solely by the function of the
article of manufacture, the design is invalid for want of being ornamental.115
It is important to note the distinction between the functionality of the
article of manufacture and the functionality of the particular design of the
article of manufacture.116  If this distinction were not drawn, then it would be
impossible to obtain a design patent on utilitarian articles of manufacture,
which is clearly not the case.117
One method of determining whether a design is functional is to see if
alternative designs are available.118  If so, then a design may not be dictated
solely by function.119  This test for functionality should sound familiar as it is
similar to the test used for merger in the copyright context.120
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4.  Non-Obviousness
The non-obviousness requirement for utility patents121 has been
incorporated by reference into the design patent statute.122  The non-obvious
bar in the Patent Act mandates that a patent not be granted when “the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which said subject matter pertains.”123  
When assessing obviousness in the design patent context, the courts have
openly admitted that this is a subjective determination.124  To help determine
whether a design is obvious, the following factors may be used: (1) the scope
and content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the prior art and the
claims at issue; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art, when the invention was
made; and (4) secondary indicia, such as commercial success and copying.125
B.  Blank Forms Receiving Design Patent Protection
Design patents have been granted to truly blank forms.  In addition to
Figure 8, supra, below are several drawings corresponding to design patents
issued within the last two decades.
350 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 31
126. U.S. Patent No. D473,264 (Apr. 15, 2003) (label form).
127. U.S. Patent No. D448,404 (Sept. 25, 2001) (address label sheet).
Figure 9126
Figure 10127
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128. U.S. Patent No. D423,044 (Apr. 18, 2000) (tab compatible divider label sheet).
129. U.S. Patent No. D312,654 (Dec. 4, 1990) (paper sheet).
Figure 11128
Figure 12129
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130. U.S. Patent No. D418,538 (Jan. 4, 2000) (multi-label mailing form sheet).
131. U.S. Patent No. D343,416 (Jan 18, 1994) (business form).
Figure 13130 
Figure 14131
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132. U.S. Patent No. D415,792 (Oct. 26, 1999) (blank sheet for practicing writing). 
133. PHG Tech.,  LLC v.  St. John Cos., 2005 WL 3301601 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 5, 2005); vacated by PHG
Tech., LLC v. St. John Cos., 493 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. Nov 17, 2006).
134. PHG Tech., LLC, 2005 WL 3301601 at *1.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at *1–2.
Figure 15132
The validity of the design patents pictured in Figures 9 through 15 have
not been contested.  However the validity of the design patent at issue in
Figure 8 was recently litigated in PHG Technologies, LLC v. The St. John
Companies.133  In PHG, the plaintiff offered software products to hospitals for
use in tracking patients and costs.134  Along with this software, the plaintiff
also sold labels used to record medical chart data and patient identification
information.135  At first, these two sets of labels were offered separately, but
the plaintiff eventually combined these two to create the label shown in Figure
8.136  The plaintiff applied for, and eventually obtained, design patents for the
ornamental design for a label pattern for a medical label sheet.137 
The defendant, plaintiff's competitor, also sold medical patient
identification labels and copied the plaintiff's labels under the belief that
“hospitals buy medical labels based on their function, not their
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146. The same court engaged in an identical analysis in a companion case involving the same plaintiff, but
different defendants.  PHG Technologies, LLC v. Timemed Labeling Sys., Inc., 2006 WL 2670967
(M.D. Tenn. Sept. 18, 2006).
147. PHG Technologies, LLC v. The St. John Cos., 469 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. Nov 17, 2006).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1367.
ornamentation.”138  After learning of the defendant's copying, the plaintiff sent
a cease and desist letter, but the copying continued and litigation ensued.139
Ruling on the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and the
defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, the district court examined
and upheld the validity of the design patents.  The defendant argued that the
design patents were invalid because the designs were primarily functional
rather than ornamental.140
The district court in PHG set forth the basic elements for design patents
protection, but immediately seized upon the functionality argument.141  The
purported ornamental features of the form were the size and placement of
labels on the sheet, but the defendant argued that the placement of different-
sized labels on the form was driven purely by function in label use and the
cost of manufacture.142  After setting forth the test for functionality and noting
that “[i]f there are several ways to achieve the function of the article of
manufacture, the design is more likely to serve a primarily ornamental
purpose,” the court found there were “a multitude of ways to arrange different
sizes of labels on an 8 ½  x 11 sheet.”143  The court also briefly addressed the
novelty issue by finding that placing various sizes of labels at the bottom of
the sheet is what distinguished the plaintiff's ornamental design from the prior
art.144  Presumably, this variation in the form was also not obvious to the
“ordinary intelligent man” or the “ordinary designer.”145  The court did not
address originality in reaching its conclusion.146
The defendant appealed and the Federal Circuit vacated the preliminary
injunction.147  The Federal Circuit held that the district court had erred in
concluding the plaintiff had met its burden of proving a likelihood of success
of the merits.148  The district court’s error was that it had ignored evidence that
the label’s placement served a functional purpose and did not examine if the
alternative designs would adversely affect the label’s utility.149  While not a
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favorable ruling for the plaintiff, the validity of the design patent is still in
effect and sufficient evidence could be presented at trial to overcome the
functionality flaw.  Importantly, the Federal Circuit did not hold that truly
blank forms are categorically denied design patent protection.  Therefore, even
if the design patent in PHG is eventually found to be invalid, the possibility
for another truly blank form to receive design patent protection remains.
IV.  A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE STANDARDS FOR
COPYRIGHT AND DESIGN PATENT PROTECTION
Having explored the general requirements of copyrights and design
patents and the historical developments of the blank forms doctrine, it will be
helpful to compare a few additional significant similarities and differences
between copyrights and design patents before exploring the inherent
inconsistency in the law denying copyright protection to truly blank forms, but
granting design patent protection.
A.  Obtaining Protection and Withstanding Challenges to Validity
It is generally recognized that design patents are more difficult to obtain
than copyrights.  As Professor Wiley noted, courts confronted by the defense
that a work is not sufficiently original “agree that copyright law demands less
originality than does the law of patent.”150
Reemphasizing this point, another commentator stressed that “[w]hat we
now have is too easy protection of some designs through copyright.  Other
designs come into design patent, which, as coldly viewed by the courts, is too
hard.”151
The belief that design patents are more difficult to obtain is based not
only upon the fact that copyright protection attaches automatically upon
creation152 but is also based on the fact that to secure design patent protection,
one must file a patent application153 and pay the prescribed fees.154  As
described supra, design patent protection requires overcoming several
hurdles)originality, novelty, non-obviousness, ornamental/non-
356 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 31
155. Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 620 F.2d 1166, 1167–68 (6th Cir. 1980).  The broadness of
design protection should not be confused with the duration of protection, in which copyright clearly
provides more protection.  Compare 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2000) with 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 303 and 304
(2000).
156. Schnadig Corp., 620 F.2d at 1168, n.3.
157. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46 (1991).
158. Schnadig Corp., 620 F.2d at 1168, n.3.
159. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000); see also Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear California, Inc., 853 F.2d 1557,
1562 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
160. L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Avia Group
Int'l, 853 F.2d at 1562.
161. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2000).
162. Id.
163. See Express, LLC v. Fetish Group, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1219 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“The
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functionality)but copyright only requires that a modicum of creativity be
exercised and the work not be copied from someone else.  
Another reason design patents are, and should be, harder to obtain is that
design patent protection is broader than copyright protection.155  Copyright
only protects one from copying.156  If one independently creates an identical
work, then copyright infringement has not occurred.157  “However, an
‘inventor’ who produces something already patented infringes the patent
regardless of his knowledge of its existence.”158  This wider scope of
protection)the power to prohibit unintentional copying)strengthens the
rationale for imposing additional burdens upon design patents.
Finally, attacking a patent's validity is more difficult than attacking the
validity of a copyright.  A patent is presumed valid.159  Invalidity of a design
patent must be established by clear and convincing evidence.160  On the other
hand, when attacking the validity of a copyright, the copyright owner is only
entitled to a presumption of validity when the work was registered with the
Copyright Office within five years of its first publication.161  The Copyright
Act further grants the court discretion to determine the weight to be given to
the certificate of registration.162  Although the courts have not set forth a
definitive standard for the burden of proof that the defendant must meet to
shift the burden back to the plaintiff, it appears that the courts do not require
a clear and convincing standard, as is required for design patents.163  As the
Third Circuit noted, “the burden on the defendant to rebut the presumption
varies depending on the issue bearing on the validity of the copyright,” but in
some situations evidence must be presented, while in others it is only
necessary to show that the Copyright Office erroneously applied the copyright
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170. Lindgren, supra note 102 at 215. 
laws in registering the work.164  As to questions regarding the copyrightability
of certain works, some suggest that the courts are in as good a position as the
Copyright Office to consider these questions and that in these situations the
presumption of validity “is of real little force.”165  Thus, the heightened
standard for invalidating design patents is yet another reason why design
patents are, and should be, more difficult to obtain than copyrights. 
B.  Infringement Standards
Another important similarity when comparing blank forms in the
copyright context with those in the design patent context is the standard for
determining infringement.  In a copyright infringement action, the standard
used to determine whether infringement has taken place is whether the alleged
infringer's work is substantially similar to the alleged infringed work.166
Determining substantial similarity is viewed from the perspective of an
ordinary lay person.167
For design patents, the standard for proving infringement requires “that
the accused design is substantially the same as the claimed design” and “the
criterion is deception of the ordinary observer, such that one design would be
confused with the other.”168  Just as in the copyright context,169 it is not
necessary for the accused product and the product protected by a design patent
to be identical; it is sufficient to show substantial similarity of appearance.170
The similarity between the tests for infringement in the copyright and
design patent contexts is striking.  Although the test for design patent
infringement leans toward confusion of the ordinary observer, the focus on
substantial similarity between works draws copyright law and design patents
law closer together, causing different treatment of similar subject matter to be
questioned.
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V.  THE INCONSISTENCY
It should now be clear that a glaring inconsistency exists between the
treatment of truly blank forms in the copyright and design patent contexts.
Copyright's blank forms doctrine, whether based on a lack  of originality or
the merger doctrine, denies protection to truly blank forms.171 In contrast,
design patents, based on the same Constitutional authority172 and maintaining
the same general principles of originality and merger173 affords protection to
truly blank forms.174  Despite the similarity of the rules governing these two
fields and the underlying policies for those rules, the lack of parity in the
treatment of truly blank forms is questionable and confusing.
This is not to say that copyright protection and design patent protection
are or should be one in the same.  In fact, the differences between the two
disciplines have led to the conclusion that design patents are, and should be,
more difficult to obtain.175  Again, this raises the question of why design
patents afford protection to truly blank forms, whereas copyright, with a low
threshold for protection, refuses to extend to truly blank forms.
Consistency in the application of closely related legal rules sharing a
common origin is not normally a hotly debated issue in the absence of a
logical reason for treating the same situations differently.  In the case of truly
blank forms, there does not appear to be any logic in denying copyright
protection, but granting design patent protection.  The treatment of truly blank
forms should be consistent under copyright and design patent laws.  If
different treatment was appropriate, it should be reversed so truly blank forms
are protected by copyright while unprotected by design patents.
VI.  POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
To bring copyright and design patent law into agreement over the
treatment of truly blank forms, there appears to be two options: eliminate
design patent protection for truly blank forms or expand copyright protection
to truly blank forms.  Each option has its own associated costs and benefits.
This article does not seek to make a determination as to which option is best,
but instead lays out the pros and cons of each choice in an effort to cause
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Congress, the Patent and Trademark Office, the Copyright Office, or the
courts to reevaluate the law's treatment of truly blank forms and judge what
is an appropriate solution.
A.  Eliminate Design Patent Protection for Blank Forms
One reason for prohibiting design patents for truly blank forms is that it
is an easy rule to implement.  As described above, truly blank forms are those
forms containing nothing more than blank spaces and are without any
accompanying text or instructions.176  A regulation promulgated and adopted
by the Patent Office or an amendment to the Patent Act based on the theories
set forth in this article could be simple and straightforward.  On the other
hand, this solution leaves open the conundrum of what should be done about
forms that are not truly blank.  As seen in the copyright context, this has
caused confusion and a circuit split over what type of blank forms are
protected.177
Another benefit of eliminating design patent protection for truly blank
forms is that once these forms are created, they automatically enter the public
domain.  Thus, the public is free to use the forms, adapt them, and use them
as a springboard for improvements.178  These adaptations and improvements
are the progresses of science and the useful arts that the Intellectual Property
Clause of the Constitution strives for.179  But to claim that elimination of
design patents would effectuate this Constitutional provision would be to read
the clause too narrowly.  This Intellectual Property Clause provides that
Congress shall have the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”180  The prelude
to promoting adaptations and improvements is that the author or inventor was
given the opportunity to reap the benefits of the creation before it passed into
the public domain.  If truly blank forms were no longer provided design patent
protection, then this prelude would not exist and the Intellectual Property
Clause would not be effectuated.
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183. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
184. See generally Advanz Behavioral Mgmt. Resources, Inc. v. Miraflor, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (C.D. Cal.
1998); Calyx Technologies, Inc. v. Ellie Mae, Inc., 2005 WL 2036918 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
Closely related to this point is that if design patent protection was no
longer afforded to truly blank forms, then inventors would, in theory, have
less incentive to develop these types of forms.  Without the incentive of design
patent protection, there would, in theory, be a decrease in the development of
truly blank forms, from which the public would no longer be able to use,
adapt, and improve.  However, this theory must be balanced with the argument
that blank forms are generally used in industries to help with efficiency and
productivity and this is what really drives the creation of truly blank forms.
Without empirical data or further research, the elimination or reduction of
incentive is speculative.
Lastly, eliminating design patent protection for truly blank forms may
lead to a decrease in patent infringement prosecution and litigation, thus
freeing up administrative and judicial resources.181  However, with respect to
design patent litigation, it should be noted that very little truly blank form
design patent litigation has taken place.182
B.  Expand Copyright Protection to Truly Blank Forms
The other option to resolve the inconsistency is to expand copyright
protection to truly blank forms.  As discussed supra, the blank forms doctrine
is already highly criticized and confusing.183  The Ninth Circuit's decision in
Bibbero compounds this and has been reluctantly followed by its district
courts.184  Expanding copyright protection to truly blank forms would moot
the split amongst the circuits as to which forms convey information and which
do not.
Just as eliminating design patent protection for truly blank forms would
be easy to implement, expanding copyright protection would be equally
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189. See Express, LLC v. Fetish Group, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1227 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“[T]hin
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simple.  But unlike the design patent solution, expanding copyright protection
would not create new problems for blank forms that are not truly blank.185
Opposite the argument made in support of and in criticism of denying
design patent protection to truly blank forms is the argument that expanding
copyright protection would provide an additional incentive for form creators
to exercise their talents and create new forms.186  The fact that some industries
create truly blank forms as a matter of efficiency and productivity would not
reduce the incentive to create new forms.187  On the other hand, if copyright
protection is expanded, then less works are placed in the public domain, which
may delay creativity (e.g. transformation, adaptations, improvements), thus
depriving the public good.188  Of course, granting thin copyright protection to
truly blank forms might provide some relief.189
As discussed supra, there is already a fair amount of blank form
copyright litigation that has taken place over the last century.190  If copyright
protection were expanded to truly blank forms (and blank forms generally),
there could be an increase in blank forms litigation, thus draining more
judicial resources.  However, granting thin copyright protection to blank forms
might also help in this regard.
Lastly, expanding copyright protection to truly blank forms might also
have the effect of freeing up resources at the Copyright Office.  If examiners
were not required to engage a blank forms analysis, which is admittedly
confusing and burdensome, more time and money couldbe spent addressing
other copyright concerns.
VII.  CONCLUSION
The law should strive to be consistent and rational.  Without these
qualities, those living under it will fail to appreciate and respect it.  The blank
forms doctrine, with its vague underpinnings and muddled history has been
interpreted inconsistently, but clearly prevents truly blank forms from being
afforded copyright protection.
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Design patents, on the other hand, have been freely granted to truly blank
forms)a level where copyright protection does not extend.  Given the general
agreement that design patents are, and should be, more difficult to obtain, it
appears that the law has turned itself completely backwards with respect to
truly blank forms.  This backwards state of affairs has produced an
inconsistent and irrational result where copyright law, with its low threshold,
rejects protection for truly blank forms whereas design patents, with their
higher burden, accepts truly blank forms with open arms.  There is no rational
explanation for this inconsistency.
Fortunately, there are solutions.  To harmonize copyright and design
patent law with respect to truly blank forms, two options exist)eliminate
design patent protection for truly blank forms or expand copyright protection
to truly blank forms.  The costs and benefits of each have been set forth and
there are various methods for implementing the choice, whichever it may be.
Ultimately, a choice should be made.  Without one, the law will continue to
be inconsistent and irrational, thus weakening society's appreciation and
respect for the rule of law.
